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Összefoglaló  
 
A tanulmány a bérhányad alakulását vizsgálja az Európai Unió országaiban, különös 
tekintettel a közelmúltban bekerült közép- és kelet-európai tagállamokra (CEEU). Miután 
megvizsgáltuk a bérhányad számításának módszertani kérdéseit, különféle stilizált tényeket 
mutatunk be, amelyek országokra, valamint az aggregált gazdaságon belüli fő termelési 
szektorokra vonatkoznak. Ezek alapján azt találjuk, hogy a CEEU-országokban mind az 
aggregált, mind a szektorális bérhányadok alacsonyabbak. Bár a strukturális átrendeződés 
jelentős volt a CEEU-gazdaságokban, ennek csekély szerepe volt a bérhányad alakulásában.  
A kivétel ez alól a mezőgazdaság, amely egyes országokban jelentősen befolyásolta a 
bérhányad szintjét és dinamikáját – részben a jelentős mérési problémák miatt. Megmutatjuk 
azt is, hogy empirikus kapcsolat áll fenn a termelékenység, a fogyasztás és beruházás relatív 
árai, valamint a bérhányad között. Azt találjuk, hogy a fejlett EU-országok és a kevésbé fejlett 
CEEU-országok szokott módon számolt bérhányada közötti különbség jelentős része a relatív 
árak közötti eltéréseknek tulajdonítható. Több magyarázatot is számba veszünk, és 
megmutatjuk, hogy realisztikus feltevések mellett egy egyszerű, kétszektoros modell 
reprodukálni képes a fő empirikus megfigyeléseket. 
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Abstract
The paper studies the labor share among countries of the European Union, with a
particular attention to newer member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEU).
After discussing methodological issues in the computation of the labor share, we
present various stylized facts at the country level, and also for broad sectors within the
aggregate economy. We find that CEEU countries typically have lower labor shares,
both in the aggregate and at the sectoral level. Structural change, while quite pro-
nounced among the CEEU economies, plays only a minor role in the evolution of the
labor share. The exception is agriculture, which for some countries have a sizable
impact on the level and dynamics of the labor share - partly because of important
measurement problems. We also document links between productivity, the relative
prices of consumption and investment, and the labor share. In particular, we find that
a significant part of the difference in conventionally measured labor shares between the
more developed EU countries and less developed CEEU countries can be attributed to
differences in relative prices. We discuss possible explanations, and show that given
reasonable assumptions, a simple two-sector model is able to account for the main
findings.
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1 Introduction
There has been a great deal of interest in academic and policy circles in the evolution of the
wage share of aggregate income, or the labor share in short. Many countries have experi-
enced a sustained fall in the labor share, which gave rise to many alternative explanations
(Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014, Elsby et al., 2013, IMF, 2007, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al.,
2018, Decreuse and Maarek, 2015a).
Our paper analyses the main developments in aggregate and sectoral labor shares
in Central-European EU countries (CEEU), compared to developed EU countries in the
1995-2017 period. First, we discuss different concepts of the labor share, and highlight
some methodological issues and compare different labor share indicators. We show that
the unadjusted labor share indicator (which ignores mixed income) hinders cross-country
comparison and the evaluation of labor share trends, since mixed income exhibits signif-
icant trends and differs across countries. We also show that the labor share is especially
hard to calculate for agriculture because the labor and capital income of farmers, who
represent a major share of total employment in agriculture, is not reported separately. As
the agricultural labor share - calculated with usual assumptions - is volatile and might
have extreme values, we report results that exclude agriculture from the analysis when
necessary.
Both the level and the dynamics of the labor share vary significantly across the CEEU
countries. Nevertheless, some common characteristics can be observed. The labor share is
lower on average in CEEU countries than in developed EU countries, both excluding and
including agriculture. In addition, all sectoral labor shares are lower in CEEU countries.
The differences between the two country groups had increased up to 2011, but some
convergence can be observed in the last few years.
Next, we analyze factors behind the observed differences in the level and dynamics
of the labor share between CEEU and developed EU countries. As our sample period
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can be characterized by significant sectoral transformation, first we look at the effect of
sectoral changes on the dynamics of the aggregate labor share. The decline in the share of
agriculture and the decrease in the agricultural labor share contributed to the decline in
the aggregate labor share in many CEEU countries. However, when excluding agriculture
from the analysis, we find that sectoral transformation does not add much to the aggregate
dynamics in the non-agricultural labor share. Cross-country differences in aggregate labor
shares are mainly attributable to differences in sectoral labor shares, while differences in
sectoral composition play only a minor role.
It is well-known that the relative price of consumption (either in terms of GDP or
investment) is generally lower in poorer countries. Given our result that within the EU
the labor share increases with development, it is not surprising that we also find a positive
correlation between the aggregate labor share and the relative price of consumption. In
fact, if we control for this relative price, the labor share is no longer systematically related
to development.
Based on these findings, we argue that relative price differentials need to be taken
into account when comparing labor shares across countries. We construct a “corrected”
labor share indicator, which accounts for differences in the relative price of consumption.
The idea behind this measure is that when we think about the labor share as workers’
compensation, it is the price of consumption - as opposed to GDP - that matters. We find
that in fact a significant part of the difference in conventionally measured labor shares
between the more developed EU countries and less developed CEEU countries can be
attributed to differences in relative prices. Finally, we document that within countries
sectors with higher labor productivity tend to have lower labor shares.
Building on the recent literature (Hsieh and Klenow, 2007, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al.,
2018), we show that a simple two-sector model with CES production functions and separate
consumption and investment sectors can explain these stylized facts. The conditions that
are required are the following: (i) underdevelopment is associated with lower productivities
in both sectors, (ii) poorer countries are particularly unproductive in the investment good
sector, and (iii) the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower in the
investment good sector.
An alternative, and possibly complementary, explanation for some of these findings is
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the different exposure to foreign direct investment (FDI) at the country and sector level.
While we do not have the necessary data to analyze the effects of FDI at the sectoral
level, we provide some preliminary evidence that countries that attracted more FDI have
a lower labor share. Foreign investors usually have a large productivity advantage. The
gains from higher productivity are shared between capital and labor, consequently sectors
with a higher foreign penetration will be both more productive and have higher wages,
but also a lower labor share.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of the differ-
ent labor share measures used in the literature. We discuss some measurement issues, with
a particular attention to agriculture. In Section 3 we present stylized facts on aggregate
labor share indicators. In Section 4 we look at the role of structural change and sectoral
composition in differences in labor shares across countries and over time. In Section 5 we
document and study the relationship between the labor share, productivity, and the rela-
tive price of consumption. In Section 6 we present a simple two-sector framework, which
under some reasonable assumption can rationalize the main empirical findings. Section 7
presents preliminary findings about the role of foreign direct investment. Finally, Section
8 concludes.
2 Measurement issues
The labor share is defined as the part of national or sectoral income allocated to wages
(labor), and it is calculated as the compensation of labor over value added. However, both
compensation of labor and value added can be calculated in various ways. In the following,
we summarize the main options and considerations behind the choice of a specific calcu-
lation method. In addition to theoretical considerations, choosing a particular method is
also influenced by data availability.
2.1 The treatment of mixed income
In separating total income into compensations of labor and capital, a problem arises with
mixed income, i.e. the income of self-employed. Mixed income contains both labor and
capital compensation and as the contribution of labor is not recorded separately, calcula-
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tion of the labor share requires making an assumption about the composition. The options
are the following.
Assumption 1. (Adjusted labor share) Hourly or yearly labor income of the self-employed
equals the hourly or yearly labor income of employees (Jaeger, 2018; Gollin, 2002).
In this case
LS =
COMP
V A
EMP
EMPE
where LS stands for the labor share, EMP is total persons employed, and EMPE is
persons in dependent employment. The difference between the EMP and EMPE is
the number of the self-employed. COMP denotes the compensation of employees, which
contains employers’ contributions on top of gross wages and salaries. V A stands for value
added.
The problem with this approach is that if the share of self-employed is very high and
the assumption of equal earnings does not hold, this assumption may distort the results
and can produce unrealistic labor share values, even above 100 % (as we show below for
agriculture in some countries).
Assumption 2. (Labor share w/o mixed income) The labor share within mixed income
equals the labor share within the rest of the economy.
LS =
COMP
COMP +GOS
As the equation shows, this amounts to calculating the labor share without mixed
income, i.e. dividing compensation of employees with the sum of COMP and gross oper-
ating surplus (GOS). This assumption is used for example in Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008). However, this method requires separate data on mixed income, which is often not
available, especially at the sectoral level.
Assumption 3. (Corporate labor share) The aggregate labor share can be well approxi-
mated by the labor share in the corporate sector.
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Some studies ((Elsby et al., 2013)) restrict attention to the corporate sector, where
mixed income is not present. The obvious advantage of this specification is that splitting
mixed income is not an issue. Disadvantages are that: (i) the corporate sector may not
be completely representative of the full economy, either because self-employment is large
or because the government sector is important, and (ii) the corporate labor share cannot
be calculated at the industry level.
Assumption 4. (Unadjusted labor share) The labor share in mixed income is zero.
LS =
COMP
V A
Using the unadjusted labor share is usually motivated by limited data availability
on mixed income and/or the number of self-employed. This measure was used in, for
example, IMF (2007) and Orszag and Orszag (2015). However, if the share of the self-
employed in total employment changes considerably in the sample period, trends in the
unadjusted labor share (as mixed income is excluded only from the numerator, but not
the denominator) can be misleading. Cross-country comparisons that are based on the
unadjusted labor share are also not appropriate if the role of the self employed in the
economy differs significantly across countries.
The corporate labor share and the labor share w/o mixed income (Assumption 2 )
partly overcome this bias as they do not require assumptions on mixed income. On the
other hand, they only give a partial picture on the labor share in the total economy.
2.2 Value added
Value added in the denominator of the labor share can be calculated at basic prices (EUK-
LEMS), market prices or factor cost (AMECO). Value added at factor cost can be written
as follows:
V Afact = COMP +GOS +MI.
Value added at basic prices as given as
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V Abasic = V Afact + (OTAXproduction −OSUBSproduction) ,
where OTAXproduction−OSUBSproduction denotes other taxes less other subsidies on pro-
duction. Finally, value added at market prices is written as
V Amarket = V Abasic + (TAXproduct − SUBSproduct)
= V Afact + (OTAXproduction −OSUBSproduction)
+ (TAXproduct − SUBSproduct) ,
where TAXproduct − SUBSproduct denotes the balance of indirect (product) taxes and
subsidies.
For a producer, value added at factor cost represents what a producer gets from the
industrial activity. Value added at basic prices, in addition to the value added at factor
costs, contains the balance of other taxes less other subsidies on production. Gross do-
mestic product, evaluated at market prices also contains the balance of product taxes and
subsidies (excise taxes, VAT) on top of basic price value added.
We calculate labor share using value added at factor cost, which is essentially a measure
of income and not output. It represents the amount remaining out of gross value added
after the payment of all taxes on production and products and the receipt of all subsidies
on production and product.
When the labor share is calculated as compensation of labor divided by value added at
basic prices, one implicitly adds the balance of other production taxes and subsidies (and
the depreciation) to capital. This can be seen by writing the value added at basic prices
in the following form:
V Abasic = COMP +MI +GOS + (OTAXproduction −OSUBSproduction) .
Loosely speaking, if the denominator is value added at basic prices, production taxes
are assumed to be paid by capital, or in case of net production subsidies, capital income is
lessened by the amount of subsidies. In other words, this decomposition implicitly assumes
that the production subsidy is given to labor. If extracting (adding) production taxes
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(subsidies) from the basic price gross value added - that is, to divide the compensation of
labor with value added at factor cost -, one assumes that the production tax (subsidy) is
paid (shared) in the same share as the rest of the value added.
The balance of other production taxes and subsidies is negligible in most countries;
Sweden, France and Italy are exceptions. At the industry level, the balance is often sizable
(negative) in case of agriculture, due to the considerable amount of production subsidies.
In these cases, labor shares calculated using basic price value added and value added at
factor cost differ significantly (see Section 3).
Baseline measure Our baseline labor share indicator is calculated with Assumption
1, as mixed income at the industry level (necessary for applying Assumption 2 ) is not
available. Our basic labor share indicator uses the number of employees and self-employed
instead of hours worked mainly because of limited data availability for the latter. As
discussed above, we use valued added at factor prices. For the aggregate labor share we
also show and compare developments for the different labor share measures.
2.3 Agriculture
The labor share is much more volatile in agriculture than in other sectors. Occasionally
the are are extreme values, sometimes above 100% (see Figure 1 for the CEEU countries).
These are related to some special characteristics of the agricultural sector. Here we discuss
two major issues: agricultural subsidies and measurement problems with farmers’ income.
Agricultural subsidies Agriculture is the sector where the distinction between value
added at factor cost and basic prices is sizable, as production subsidies, mainly coming
from EU funds are large compared to the value added of the sector. When labor shares
are calculated using value added at basic prices (for example in EUKLEMS), the balance
of taxes and subsidies on production is included in value added. Consequently it does
not contain the significant net amounts arriving from agricultural funds, although these
subsidies constitute an important part of the income of the sector. We think that value
added at factor cost is a more appropriate measure for calculating the labor share. It
represents the amount remaining out of gross value added after the paying all taxes and
8
Figure 1: Agriculture and non-agricultural total labor share in CEEU countries
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receiving all subsidies, which is the amount that is distributed between labor and capital.
The difference between labor shares including and excluding subsidies started to in-
crease in the CEEU countries after accession to the EU. It is sizable, 10-20 percentage
points in many countries (Figure 20 in the Appendix). Nevertheless, the agricultural labor
share can be extreme and highly volatile even taking subsidies into consideration, which
is attributable to the measurement problems of farmer’s labor income.
High share of self-employed farmers Sectoral labor shares are constructed with the
assumption that entrepreneurs earn the same wage as wage earners in the given sector.
However, in many countries the majority of agricultural employment comes from self-
employed farmers who do not report wage income and profit separately (Figure 22 in the
Appendix). The assumption that farmers earn the same labor income as employees in
agriculture may produce volatile, and in some cases extreme labor shares in agriculture,
often above 100% (Figure 1). This problem is not exclusive to the CEEU countries, as
some more developed EU countries also have extremely high agricultural labor shares
(Figure 23 in the Appendix). Due to the low weight of agriculture in the economy in
9
advanced countries, these measurement problems are not important for the total economy
labor share. For emerging economies such as the CEEU, mismeasurement in agriculture
may have a measurable effect on the aggregate labor share, especially at the beginning of
the sample period (see Figure 25).
3 Aggregate labor share in the CEEU countries
In the following, we analyze developments in different aggregate labor share indicators
in the CEEU countries. We calculate the following alternative aggregate labor share
indicators: (i) with Assumption 2 (without mixed income), (ii) the corporate labor share,
and (iii) the unadjusted labor share.
3.1 Data sources
Our data sources are the following:
• National accounts aggregates by industry (up to NACE A*64) : consumption of
capital, taxes and subsidies, value added, compensation of employees (EUROSTAT)
• National accounts employment data by industry (up to NACE A*64) employment
data (EUROSTAT)
• National accounts employment data by industry (up to NACE A*10) Croatia em-
ployment 1995-2008, Latvia, Bulgaria employment 1995-2000 (EUROSTAT)
• National accounts aggregates by industry (up to NACE A*10) Croatia value added
1995-2008, Latvia, Bulgaria value added 1995-2000 (EUROSTAT)
• National accounts, Nonfinancial transactions: mixed income, gross of total econ-
omy, gross operational surplus and value added at the non-financial corporations,
EUROSTAT
• EUKLEMS dataset (2017 release): value added for industries at constant prices
(VA QI)
• Poland EUKLEMS 2007: sectoral employment data for 1995-2000
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• PPP database, EUROSTAT relative prices, PPS
• Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2017), ”International Financial Inte-
gration in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis,” IMF Working Paper 17/115:
net fdi liabilities
Our sample period is 1995-2017, containing 24 EU countries. Out of the 28 EU countries,
we dropped 3 small countries (Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg) and Ireland, as its real GDP
jumped by 26 percent in 2015. This increase is related to certain accounting methods
of the SNA, rather than to an actual jump in the country’s real economic performance.
The group of CEEU countries consists of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Romania. Developed EU countries
- referred as EU13 - are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,Greece,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
Employment can be calculated by the number of hours worked or number of persons.
The theoretically correct solution is to take the working time of the employed also into
consideration, i.e. to use total number of hours worked. However, data on working hours
are often missing and unreliable, so in what follows we use the more accurate and available
employment data.
3.2 Comparing labor share measures
Comparing the different labor share indicators reveals that significant changes in the labor
share are usually captured by most labor share indicators, with some notable exceptions
(Figure 2).1 The unadjusted labor share, which excludes mixed income only from the
numerator and not the denominator, is usually well below other indicators. Moreover, in
countries where the share of mixed income changed considerably in the sample period,
for example in Hungary, its trend also differs from that of other labor share measures.
We think that the unadjusted labor share is not a proper measure for making cross coun-
try comparisons and assessing trends over time, as the share of mixed income exhibits
significant trends and differences across countries (see Figure 3).
1All indicators are based on value added at factor cost. At the aggregate level, for most countries the
choice between basic price or factor cost value added does not influence the labor market share significantly.
In Sweden, France and Italy, however, the two indicators differ by 2-5 percentage points (see Appendix,
Figure 21).
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Figure 2: Aggregate labor shares in CEEU countries
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Figure 3: Share of mixed income in total value added in CEEU countries
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The worldwide decline of the labor share in recent decades, which is documented in the
literature extensively (e.g. Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; IMF, 2007), is not generally
observable in the CEEU countries in the 1995-2017 sample period. Labor share decline is
not a common feature of developed EU countries either, as in many countries the labor
share decrease had already happened in the preceding decades (see Appendix, Figure 24).
Now we turn to average differences in the level and dynamics of the labor share across
two broad country groups, the CEEU countries and the EU13 economies (definitions are
given in the data section above). We take simple country averages for both groups, i.e. we
do not adjust for different populations or GDP. Doing so would be especially problematic
for the CEEU group, since the weight of Poland (and to a lesser extent Romania) would
dominate the analysis.
The level of the total labor share is on average lower in CEEU countries than in the
EU13 countries.2 As Figure 4 shows, the majority of CEEU countries can be characterized
by relatively low aggregate labor shares (exceptions are Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia).
Regarding dynamics, total economy labor shares declined in the CEEU countries between
1995-2011, increasing the gap between the two country groups (Figure 5). Since 2011, the
total economy labor share has increased on average in the CEEU countries, decreasing the
gap between the two country groups.
4 Sectoral analysis
In this section we study the labor share at a more disaggregated level. We again focus
on differences between the two country groups, CEEU and EU13. We define four broad
sectors in the economy, based on the production side. Using the SNA2010 classification,
the categories are the following:
1. Agriculture: A
2. Industry: B, C, D, E, F
3. Market services:G, H, I, J, K, M, N, R, S, T, U
4. Non-market services:L, O, P, Q
2In a pooled OLS regression of all aggregate labor share on the dummy for CEEU countries, the dummy
is significant at 1 % and shows that the aggregate labor shares are lower by 4 percentage points including
agriculture, and 8 percentage points excluding agriculture.
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Figure 4: Adjusted aggregate labor shares in CEEU and EU13 countries in 2017
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In addition to presenting the evolution of the sectoral indicators, one of our main
questions is about the importance of sectoral reallocation in explaining changes in the
aggregate labor share. This is particularly interesting for the CEEU countries, where
economic transition was accompanied by significant sectoral reallocation. Unfortunately
our data only goes back to 1995, when these processes were already well under way.
Nevertheless, a few interesting results emerge, especially when considering changes in
agriculture. Our sectoral analysis covers the 1995-2016 period.
4.1 Sectoral labor shares and structural transformation
The basic findings are presented on Figure 6, which plots the labor shares for the four
sectors and two country groups. The following results emerge.
Figure 6: Sectoral labor shares in developed EU (EU13) and Central-European EU
(CEEU) countries (unweighted averages)
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First, all labor shares in the non-agricultural sectors are lower in the CEEU countries.
The opposite is true in agriculture, but as we discussed above and explore below in more
detail, the agricultural labor share suffers from severe data problems. The obvious indica-
tion for these issues in the CEEU economies is that the labor share in agriculture is very
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high, and it is actually above one before 2010.
Second, the dynamics of the labor share are very different across sectors in the CEEU
countries. We see a large drop and divergence in industry labor share, and convergence
- increases - in both market and non-market services. A partial exception is the 2009-
2014 period, where the labor shares in the nonmarket services sector diverged sharply.
This might be a consequence of the economic crisis, when fiscal consolidation hit wages in
the public sector particularly hard in the CEEU countries. By 2016, the labor shares in
the manufacturing and nonmarket sectors were back to their pre-crisis levels, and further
convergence between the country groups looks likely.
Figure 7: Average aggregated labor share excluding agriculture in CEEU and EU13 coun-
tries
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Third, the agricultural labor share is unreliable, at least in the CEEU countries. To
see the impact of agriculture on the aggregate labor share, we reproduce Figure 5 for the
non-agricultural part of the economy. Figure 7 presents the results, along with the total
economy labor shares from Figure 5. Strikingly, while the non-agricultural labor share is
also much lower in the CEEU group, the large decline between 1995-2006 is hardly visible
any more. Without agriculture, the labor shares are quite stable in both the CEEU and
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EU13 groups.
4.2 Shift-share analysis
Figure 8: Weight of subsectors in total value added
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The sectoral composition of the economy has changed considerably in the EU countries
for the last twenty years and the basic pattern of sectoral transformation is similar in EU13
and non CEEU countries (Figure 8). Specifically, the period can be characterized by an
increase in the service sectors and a decrease in manufacturing and agriculture. However,
in CEEU countries, the weight of agriculture was much higher in the beginning of the
period and the decrease is more pronounced in the 1995-2016 period. Also, the decrease
in manufacturing is less marked (it has even increased in some countries), and the increase
in market services is more robust. Structural transformation still lags behind in CEEU
countries3. The weights of agriculture and manufacturing are higher, and the weight of
services is lower than in the more developed EU countries.
3In this section we do not consider the role of cross-country relative prices, i.e. that the relative price
of services to GDP is much lower in the CEEU than in the EU13. At international prices the weight of
services in CEEU countries increases. We address comparisons at international prices in section 5.2 and
5.3.
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We now turn to the role of changes in structural composition in aggregate labor share
developments. The change in the aggregate labor share can be decomposed into the
contribution of changes in sectoral labor shares, and the contribution of changes in sectoral
composition. The weights are given by the share of the given sector in total value added:4
αt =
∑
j
sjtαjt
∆αt =
∑
j
sjtαjt −
∑
j
sj,t−1αj,t−1
=
∑
j
αj,t−1 (sjt − sj,t−1) +
∑
j
sjt (αjt − αj,t−1)
Figure 9 displays the decomposition. The bulk of the aggregate labor share change
comes from within sector labor share changes. However, in some Central European coun-
tries (Romania, Poland and Slovenia) sectoral restructuring also contributed to a lower
aggregate labor share. In particular, the decrease in the ratio of high labor share agricul-
ture in total value added also contributed to the decrease in the aggregate labor share in
some CEEU countries (See Figure 10 below). Note that in Poland, Romania, and Slovenia
the labor share in agriculture is excessively high and exceeds 100% (see section 2).
Figure 10 looks at the contribution of agriculture in more detail. The total impact
of agriculture is defined as the sum of the reallocation component (the shrinkage of the
sector), and the within sector component (labor share changes within agriculture). We
find that in many CEEU countries (Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania) agriculture
did in fact play a large role in the overall fall in the aggregate labor share. However, when
excluding agriculture from the analysis, we find that sectoral transformation does not add
much to the aggregate dynamics in the non-agricultural labor share (see Appendix, Figure
26).
4The sum of contribution of changes in sectoral composition and sectoral labor shares might slightly
differ from change in aggregate labor share in the same period. The explanation lies in the following
aggregation problem. The adjusted labor share adjusts the compensation of employees to value added
with the employed over employee ratio. As this ratio might vary significantly across sectors, the total
economy labor share, calculated aggregating the sectoral labor shares does not necessarily coincide with
the aggregate labor share calculated by adjusting the aggregated compensation of employee to value added
ratio with aggregated employee-employment ratio. To ensure additivity, in the section we decompose the
labor share which is aggregated from sectoral labor shares, while in aggregate analysis, we use original
labor share, which is calculated from total economy aggregates.
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Figure 9: Decomposition of contribution of change in sectoral composition and sectoral
labor shares to change in aggregate labor share including agriculture,1995-2016
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Figure 10: Contribution of agriculture to change in aggregate labor share,1995-2016
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
BG CZ EE HR HU LT LV PL RO SI SK AT BE DE DK EL ES FI FR IT NL PT SE UK
Non-agriculture weight Non-agriculture labor share
Agriculture weight Agriculture labor share
19
4.3 Shift share analysis - cross-sectional decomposition
After looking at changes over time, in this section we decompose cross-sectional differences
in the aggregate labor share into within sector components and the composition effect. We
decompose the aggregate labor share including agriculture.
αit =
∑
s
sistαist
αit − αjt =
∑
s
sistαist −
∑
s
sjstαjst
=
∑
s
αist (sist − sjst) +
∑
s
sjst (αjst − αist)
The bulk of the difference in country labor shares compared to Germany is explained by
differences in sectoral labor shares, and the contribution of different sectoral composition
is negligible (Figure 11).
Figure 11: Decomposition of difference in aggregate labor share (including agriculture)
compared to Germany, 2016
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5 Relative prices, the level of development and labor share
5.1 Relative price and labor share
In theory, the relationship between the level of economic development and the labor share is
not straightforward and might depend on a number of factors (the elasticity of substitution,
capital mobility, trade integration, sectoral differences). Section 3 demonstrates that labor
shares are lower in the less developed CEEU countries on average, and in Section 4 we show
that this difference can not be attributed to differences in sectoral labor shares. Lower
labor shares in developing and emerging countries is also documented in IMF (2007).
Table 1: Panel regressions of labor share on value added per employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES relative labor share relative price of AIC
relative productivity 0.116** 0.0401 0.0716***
(0.0534) (0.0742) (0.0208)
relative price of AIC 1.192*** 1.064**
(0.364) (0.511)
Constant 0.873*** -0.283 -0.178 0.988***
(0.0559) (0.375) (0.489) (0.0182)
Observations 529 529 529 529
R-squared 0.099 0.213 0.220 0.264
Year FE YES YES YES YES
country FE NO NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All variables are expressed relative to Germany
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We run panel regressions to find that there is indeed a positive correlation between
value added per employed and the labor share among EU countries. In the first column of
Table 1, our baseline labor share indicator (adjusted, based on value added at factor cost)
is regressed on labor productivity (the value added at factor cost per number of employed
in PPS), and both indicators are expressed relative to Germany. The results indicate that
there is a significant positive correlation in time fixed effect specification.5
In international comparisons, the ratio of the price level of consumption (Pc) to the
price level of GDP (Pgdp) tends to increase with the level of development (Figure 12,
5The correlation disappears in the country fixed effect specification, which implies that the positive
correlation between labor productivity and the labor share is identified from cross-country variation.
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first panel). In other words, the purchasing power of wages in terms of consumption
- as compared to the purchasing power of a unit of currency over total GDP - tends
to decrease with the level of development. This positive correlation between the relative
price of consumption and income is documented for example in Barro (1991) and Hsieh and
Klenow (2007). As Hsieh and Klenow (2007) argue, the lower relative price of consumption
and the higher relative price of investment in poorer countries is a consequence of these
countries being relatively less productive in tradables. As the share of nontraded services
is larger in consumption goods than in investment goods, poor countries have a lower
productivity in producing investment goods, and also in producing tradable goods in
exchange for investment goods (relative to their productivity in the nontradable service
sector).
Figure 12: The relationship between (a) the relative price of AIC to GDP and productivity;
(b) the level of producer real wage and the relative price of AIC to GDP; (c) the adjusted
labor share and the relative price of AIC to GDP: EU 24, pooled cross-section data relative
to the EU15 average, 1995-2017
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This implies that between countries at different levels of development, differences in
the consumption value (purchasing power) of wages, i.e., adjusted for differences in the
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relative price of consumption, tend to be milder than what is suggested by differences in
producer real wages (i.e. wages in euros deflated by the price level of GDP, Figure 12,b).
Similarly to producer real wages, adjusted labor shares are also positively correlated with
the relative price of individual consumption see (Figure 12,c).
Again, we run panel regression and find a positive relationship between the relative
price of consumption and value added per employment and between the relative price of
consumption and labor shares (see 2. and 4. columns of Table 1). In the estimations,
the relative price of actual individual consumption is measured by the index of price
level of actual individual consumption to the price level of GDP, and similarly to labor
productivity and the labor share, it is expressed relative to Germany. When the labor
share is regressed on both the adjusted relative price of consumption and productivity, the
coefficient of relative productivity looses its significance (see 3. column in Table 1 ).
5.2 Labor share corrections and decompositions
We can decompose the adjusted labor share (LS) into the producer real wage and labor
productivity. The decomposition, using logarithms of the variables can be written as the
following:
ls = (comp− gdp)− (empe− emp)
= (comp− empe)− (qgdp + pgdp − emp)
= [(comp− pgdp)− empe]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prod. real wage
− (qgdp − emp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor productivity
(1)
= [(comp− empe+ emp)− qgdp]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unit labor cost
−pgdp, (2)
where qgdp and pgdp denote the (logs of) the volume and price level of GDP. From the
point of view of the welfare of wage-earners, however, what matters is the price level
of consumption (rather than that of GDP). Therefore, for the purposes of international
comparisons, it makes sense to correct the conventionally interpreted labor shares with
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the relative price of consumption:
lscorr = ls− (pc − pgdp)
= [(comp− pc)− empe]− (qgdp − emp)
The above correction implies that nominal wages are deflated by the price of consumption
instead of the price of GDP. The logarithm of our corrected labor share is thus the difference
between the log consumer real wage and log labor productivity.6
However, the “welfare” argument (i.e., the relative purchasing power of wages) is not
essential for correcting conventionally interpreted labor shares by the relative price level
of actual individual consumption to GDP. It is sufficient to observe that, in international
comparison, conventionally measured labor shares are positively correlated with this par-
ticular internal relative price. Therefore, if the ratio of wages to GDP is compared across
countries by valuing both wages and GDP at the cross-country relative price of GDP
(what is implicitly done by applying the conventional measure of adjusted labor shares),
observed international differences in labor shares tend to be distorted by an internal rela-
tive price, which should actually be adjusted for, if the purpose is cross-country comparison
in real terms. The essential argument for correcting wage shares by differences in relative
prices is exactly the same as the one that applies for correcting “nominal” consumption
and/or investment shares in GDP by the relative prices of these items for the purposes
of comparisons across countries at significantly different levels of economic development.
(e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2007). Comparisons in “nominal” terms (at current prices and
exchange rates) are affected by the fact that the lower the relative level of economic de-
velopment, the lower is the relative price of consumption and the higher is the relative
price of investments. These systematic differences in relative prices need to be corrected
for in order to make economically meaningful (real) comparisons between consumption
6It is important to note that our deflator for quantifying the relative “consumer real wage” is the
cross-country relative price index of actual individual consumption (AIC), which includes, in addition to
household consumption expenditure (roughly: the cross-country concept of the CPI), the relative price of
transfers in kind to households by the government (e.g. education, healthcare etc.). The reason for including
these items in the deflator is that the concept of wages considered in our study is a gross one (compensation
of employees includes taxes and social contributions). Taxes on wages and social contributions are assumed
to cover social transfers in kind to households. Our deflator of wages does not include the relative price of
collective consumption (e.g., police, defense etc.), as the latter item is not directly related to the concept
of household consumption and to the “purchasing power” of gross wages.
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(investment) shares of less and more aﬄuent countries. This argument obviously applies
for international comparisons of labor shares as well.
Figure 13 displays the conventional adjusted labor share and the corrected labor share
for the average of CEEU and EU13 countries. The main message of the chart is that a
significant part of the difference in conventionally measured labor shares between the two
country groups can be attributed to differences in relative prices.
Figure 13: The evolution of the conventional and the corrected labor share in the CEEU
and the EU13 (unweighted averages, 1995-2017)
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There was relatively little change between 1995 and 2017 in the average of the EU13
(disregarding a temporary increase in 2009) and the conventional and corrected labor
shares moved closely together. By contrast, in the CEEU11 the differences between the
two indicators were significant and both made large swings over the 23 years observed.
The conventional labor share in the EU13 was continuously above that of the CEEU11
during the period. The corrected labor share, in turn, was at the same level in the two
regions both at the beginning and the end of the period observed. This implies that the
difference in conventionally measured labor shares in the beginning and the end of the
period between the CEEU11 and the EU13 was due to differences in relative prices. The
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cross-section “nominal” differences observed in 1995 and 2017 (bold lines) disappear if the
effect of relative prices is controlled for (dashed lines).
The labor share of country i relative to the EU average can be decomposed in two
meaningful ways: first, into a relative producer real wage (wprod) and a labor productivity
(lp) component (this follows directly from eq. [1], and second,into the relative unit labor
cost (ulc) and the spatial price index of GDP (pgdp), (which follows directly from eq. [2]).
lsi − lseu = (wiprod–weuprod)− (lpi − lpeu) (3)
lsi − lseu = (ulci − ulceu)− (pigdp − peugdp) . (4)
The relative producer real wage is the nominal wage per employee (in euro) deflated
by the spatial price index of production (pgdp), and relative productivity is nominal GDP
at factor cost (in euros) per employed persons deflated by pgdp – as compared to the EU.
As for the second decomposition, relative ULC is the ratio of compensation per employee
(in euros) to productivity – also compared to the EU. The first decomposition indicates
that, in an accounting sense, relative levels of labor shares are positively related to relative
levels of producer real wages, and negatively to relative levels of productivity. The second
shows that, in an accounting sense, labor shares are positively related to the relative level
of ULC, and negatively to the spatial price index of GDP.
These decompositions concern the conventional interpretation of the labor share. How-
ever, as discussed above, there are grounds for defining the concept of a “corrected labor
share”, which corrects for the cross-country differences in the relative price of actual in-
dividual consumption to GDP (Pc/Pgdp, which is positively correlated with the level of
development). The correction is motivated by welfare arguments (from the point of view
wage earners, the purchasing power of wages matters) and by the observation that con-
ventionally interpreted (or “nominal”) labor shares, similarly to consumption rates, are
positively associated with the relative price of consumption. The corrected labor share in
country i relative to the EU13 average (in logs):
lsicorr − lseucorr = lsi − lseu −
[(
pic − peuc
)− (pigdp − peugdp)] , (5)
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where the second term on the right hand side is the relative price of AIC to GDP as com-
pared to the EU. This expression can be decomposed, similarly to (3) and (4), into a real
wage and a productivity component on the one hand, and a ULC and a price component
on the other. The difference in the decomposition of the conventional (“nominal”) and the
corrected labor share is that in the latter case the real wage in (3) is close to the concept
of “consumer real wage” (nominal - euro - wages are deflated by Pc), and in (4) nominal
ULC is also adjusted by Pc, rather than by Pgdp.
Figure 14: Components of the conventional (left) and the corrected (right) labor share:
CEEU/EU13 (unweighted averages); 1995-2017
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The two interpretations and two decompositions of the labor share imply two stories
from two angles regarding developments in labor shares in the CEEU relative to the EU137
(Figure 14). One is about the conventionally interpreted labor share (the two charts on
the left), the other concerns the corrected labor share (the two charts on the right). Both
are decomposed into a productivity and a real wage component (upper two charts), as well
as into an ULC and a price component (lower two charts). The comparison of the charts
7As before, we aggregate the country-level measures introduced above for the two group of countries as
simple arithmetic averages.
27
referring to the conventional (left) vs. the corrected (right) labor share indicate that with
respect to the former, the CEEU was constantly below the EU13, while the average of the
two groups was the same in both 1995 and 2017, if the corrected labor share is considered.
One story is about the relationship between productivity, producer real wages and
labor shares. The other one is about the evolution of ULCs, relative prices and labor
shares. The upper two panes indicate that relative productivity increased continuously
in the CEEU, but the increase in relative producer real wages fell behind the increase
in productivity (left pane), while relative consumer real wages caught up to productivity
by 2017. The lower two charts, in turn, suggest that there has been a relative fall in
both ULC and relative prices after 2011, however, the fall in the relative price of actual
individual consumption was less pronounced than in the GDP deflator, which contributed
to a steady increase in the corrected labor share between 2011 and 2017.
Figure 15: The relative price of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to GDP and to
actual individual consumption as a function of GDP per employed in the EU24 between
1999 and 2017; pooled cross-section data (EU15=1)
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5.3 The relative price of investment, the investment rate and the capital
share measured at domestic and international prices
As shown by Figure 15, similarly to the global pattern (addressed by e.g., Hsieh and
Klenow, 2007), within the EU the relative price of investments (gross fixed capital forma-
tion, GFCF) to both GDP and actual individual consumption (AIC) decreases with the
level of productivity.8 This has implications for the comparison of investment rates and
capital shares among countries at different levels of economic development.
Figure 16: The investment-to-GDP ratio measured at domestic and international (average
EU15) prices as a function of GDP/employed in the EU24 between 1999 and 2017; pooled
cross-section data
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Given that the relative price of investments tends to be higher (lower) in less (more)
developed economies, the international comparison of investment rates measured at do-
mestic prices may be misleading. More specifically, the nominal share of investments in
8It is worth noting that the data for the EU support the claim of Hsieh and Klenow (2007): “The
high relative price of investment in poor countries is due to the low price of consumption goods in those
countries. Investment prices are no higher in poor countries.” This claim was contested by e.g., Alfaro and
Ahmed (2010), who found evidence of investment goods being more expensive in less developed countries.
Regarding the EU, however, the price level of investments is clearly lower in less developed countries than
in more developed ones, while the price level of consumption is yet even lower. This pattern accounts for
the high relative price of investment in less developed countries within the EU.
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GDP at current prices is affected by both the relative price of investments and the “real”
ratio of investments to GDP. In cross-country comparisons this “real” ratio can be inter-
preted as the share of investments measured at common international prices (in our case:
the average prices of the EU15; see Figure 16).
Figure 16 indicates that, within the EU, the negative relationship between the invest-
ment rate and the level of productivity, as measured at domestic prices, turns positive, if
the investment rate is measured at international (EU15-average) prices. That is, the “real”
investment rate – the nominal rate adjusted by relative prices – increases with the level
of development.9
Figure 17: The conventionally defined capital share (KS) and alternative indicators of the
corrected capital share as a function of GDP per employed in 24 EU countries relative to
the EU15 average: pooled cross-section data for the period 1999-2017
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This observation leads to the international comparison of capital shares. The capital
share, as conventionally defined, is 1 minus the adjusted labor share in GDP at factor cost.
However, as discussed in the foregoing, for the purposes of international comparisons, the
9Our panel regressions indicate that in our sample, covering 24 EU-countries over 19 years, 1% higher
real productivity involves 0.11% lower nominal investment rate (s.e.: 0,051; R2= 0,052), but 0.22% higher
real investment rate (s.e.: 0.046; R2= 0.19). By “nominal” and “real”, respectively, we refer to investment
rates measured at domestic and international prices.
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labor share may be rewritten by correcting for the relative price of actual individual
consumption to GDP. By implication, the corrected capital share can be defined as 1
minus the corrected labor share. Alternatively, it can also be defined as the conventionally
defined capital share corrected for the relative price of investment to GDP. Figure 17 shows
the pooled cross-section data for the three interpretations of the capital share as a function
of GDP/employed for 24 EU countries.
The relationship between the conventionally defined capital share and the level of pro-
ductivity – similarly to the relationship between the investment rate measured at domestic
prices and the level of productivity (see Figure 16) – is clearly negative in the EU. However,
if capital shares are corrected for differences in the relative price of investments (see the
black regression line) – again, similarly to the investment ratio – a positive association can
be observed between the capital share and the level of development. The corrected capital
share as implied by the corrected labor share (red line) is much closer to the conventionally
interpreted capital share. The reason is that the weight of consumption, as compared to
investments, is higher in GDP, therefore the price level of consumption is much closer to
that of GDP than the price level of investments.
Finally, we show the evolution of the three indicators of the capital share for the
CEEU10 countries relative to the more developed EU13 (Figure 18). The ratios of un-
weighted averages are considered for the period 1999-2017. The comparison of the con-
ventionally interpreted capital share (blue line) suggests that, in relative terms, the portion
of capital income in GDP at factor cost was constantly higher in the CEEU than in the
EU13, it even increased until 2011, and gradually fell to the level of 1999 by 2017 (to
110%). If we correct the capital share by the relative price of investments to GDP (green
line), we observe a completely different picture, suggesting that the capital share in the
CEEU has been consistently below that of the EU13, reached a peak of 95% in 2011 and
fell to 90% by 2017.
This, however, is unlikely to be an adequate representation of actual developments. The
relative price of investments serves for correcting the nominal level (ratio) of investments,
and may be unsuitable for correcting the share of capital income. In our judgement, the
10In this section, aggregates, the group of CEEU countries does not contain Croatia due to data avail-
ability
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Figure 18: Three measures of the capital share in the CEEU relative to the EU13 (un-
weighted averages, 1999-2017)
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orange line (the capital share implied by the corrected labor share) may be the closest to
an adequate estimate of the “real” capital share. In this interpretation, the “real” capital
share mirrors the evolution of the corrected labor share: it was almost the same in the
EU10 and the EU13 in the years 1999 and 2017. Until 2011 there was a relative increase,
followed by a sharp relative decline.
5.4 Labor share and productivity at the sectoral level
While labor productivity and the adjusted labor share are positively correlated across
countries, we find a significant negative relationship between labor productivity and sec-
toral labor shares within a country. The relationship between labor productivity and labor
share is estimated in a three dimensional panel, using country fixed effects. As sectoral
PPP-s are not available, productivity and sectoral labor productivity levels are not di-
rectly comparable across countries. Therefore, we can only use the within variation for
the estimation. The dependent variable is the sectoral labor share and the explanatory
variable is the sectoral value added over the number of total employment in the sector.
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The relationship is significantly negative in all specifications, with and without year and
sector fixed effect (Table 2).
Table 2: Panel regressions on sectoral labor productivity and sectoral labor shares (three
dimensional panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
labor share labor share
VARIABLES including agriculture excluding agriculture
ln productivity -0.249*** -0.327*** -0.135*** -0.0958***
(0.0674) (0.0856) (0.0305) (0.0306)
Constant 1.513*** 1.671*** 1.162*** 1.001***
(0.221) (0.254) (0.116) (0.113)
Observations 2,180 2,180 1,635 1,635
R-squared 0.298 0.318 0.283 0.388
Number of con 24 24 24 24
Year FE YES YES YES YES
country FE YES YES YES YES
sector FE NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
ln productivity stands for value added per employed in own currency in log
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 A simple framework
Our empirical findings can be summarized qualitatively as follows:
(F1) There is a positive correlation between relative development and the labor share
across countries.
(F2) There is a negative correlation between labor productivity and the labor share across
sectors.
(F3) There is a positive correlation between the relative price of consumption and the
labor share across countries.
In this section we present a simple model that is consistent with these findings, given a
few key assumptions about model parameters. The discussion is largely based on Alvarez-
Cuadrado et al. (2018) (ALP henceforth), and Hsieh and Klenow (2007) (HK henceforth).
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6.1 Firms
We assume a two sector economy, where the sectors produce a consumption and an in-
vestment good, respectively. Production function are CES, and are given in sector s = c, i
by11
ys = As
[
αk
1− 1
σs
s + (1− α) l1−
1
σs
s
] σs
σs−1
.
Notice that we assume level differences in technology as in HK, but also allow for possibly
different substitution elasticities across sectors. ALP use an even more general functional
form, where factor-biased technological differences are possible, and the α parameter is also
sector specific. Since we can reproduce the stylized facts above without these additional
sources of heterogeneity, we apply Occam’s razor and ignore them.
Perfect competition on factor markets and the free movement of factors across sectors
implies that marginal value products are equalized:
(r =)αk
− 1
σc
c Ac
(
yc
Ac
) 1
σc
= pαk
− 1
σi
i Ai
(
yi
Ai
) 1
σi
(w =) (1− α) l−
1
σc
c Ac
(
yc
Ac
) 1
σc
= p (1− α) l−
1
σi
i Ai
(
yi
Ai
) 1
σi
,
where p is the relative price of investment (consumption is the numeraire).12 Combining
these conditions yields two key equations on the production side:
κi = κ
σi
σc
c (6)
p =
Ac
Ai
(
ακ
1− 1
σc
c + 1− α
) 1
σc−1
(
ακ
σi
σc
− 1
σc
c + 1− α
) 1
σi−1
, (7)
where κs = ks/ls is the capital-labor ratio in sector s.
11We omit the time subscript unless it is necessary not to.
12Note that we work with the relative price of investment here, in our simple framework this is the
inverse of the relative price of consumption.
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6.2 Households and steady state
We assume a representative household that maximizes intertemporal utility subject to its
budget constraint:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt log ct
s.t. ct + ptit = wtlt + rtkt
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + it.
The first-order conditions lead to a standard Euler equation:
1
ct
= β (rt+1 + 1− δ) 1
ct+1
.
We focus on a steady state where productivity and endogenous variables are constant.
Using the firm first order conditions for capital in the Euler equation (8), we get that
1
β
− 1 + δ = αAc
[
α+ (1− α)κ1−
1
σc
c
] 1
σc−1
. (8)
Let us normalize labor supply to unity, i.e. lc + li = 1. The market clearing conditions
for investment goods and capital are then given by
δκ = Ai (1− lc)
(
ακ
1− 1
σi
i + 1− α
) σi
σi−1
(9)
κ = lcκc + (1− lc)κi. (10)
The steady state equilibrium of the model is described by equations (6), (7), (8), (9) and
(10). The endogenous variables are κi, κc, p, lc and κ.
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6.3 The labor share(s)
Now we are ready to interpret the empirical findings through the lens of our theory. Using
the results from above, one can write the aggregate labor share as follows:
w (lc + li)
yc + piyi
=
(1− αc)
(
yc
Aclc
) 1
σc l
lc
yc
Aclc
+ li
(
pAcAi
)1−σi (1−αc
1−αi
)σi ( yc
Aclc
) σi
σc
, (11)
and
yc
Aclc
=
(
ακ
1− 1
σc
c + 1− α
) 1
σc−1
.
From (7) it is clear that p (Ac/Ai) is a function of κc only. Therefore, the same is true
for the labor share. The relationship between relative development and the labor share
therefore depends only on the capital-labor ratio in the consumption sector.
Equation (8) clearly shows that the steady state κc depends on the relative productivity
of the consumption sector. The sign of this relationship depends on the elasticity of
substitution in the consumption sector, σc. In the empirically relevant case, σc < 1
(Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2018). Assuming that Ac < 1, the first result (F1) follows.
13
Formally, this is easy to establish with a straightforward, but tedious differentiation of
(11) with respect to κc.
Let us now turn to our second empirical finding (F2). The sectoral labor shares can
be written as scL = w/ (yc/lc) and s
i
L = w/ (pyi/li). Using equations (6) and (7), these
simplify to the following:
scL =
1− α
ακ
1− 1
σc
c + 1− α
siL =
1− α
ακ
σi
σc
− 1
σc
c + 1− α
.
Under a reasonable calibration, κc > 1. Also, as we discuss below and in line with Hsieh
and Klenow (2007), the consumption good sector is the more productive one. To be
13We could also assume that the country is below its steady state, which would further lower the aggregate
capital-labor ratio, and hence κc. Alternatively, we could introduce a steady state distortion on the capital
market. As long as this distortion is larger for poorer countries, the result is strengthened. Therefore, the
condition that Ac < 1 is sufficient, but not necessary to induce an inverse relationship between development
and the labor share, as long as σc < 1.
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consistent with F3 (scL < s
i
L), we thus require that σi < σc. The model can reproduce the
cross-sector relationship between productivity and the labor share as long as the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor is smaller in the investment sector.
Now we can turn to our third stylized fact, which states that the relative price of
investment is negatively correlated with the labor share. From equation (7) we can see
that the relative price depends on relative productivity Ac/Ai and the capital-labor ratio
κc. It is easy to see that given our previous assumption σi < σc, the relative price increases
with κc. Since the aggregate labor share is also increasing in κc, the only way to reproduce
the empirical finding F3 is to assume Ai < Ac. The direct effect through productivity has
to be stronger than the indirect effect through the capital-labor ratio. We show below
that for a reasonable calibration this is indeed the case.
To summarize, the model is consistent with stylized facts F1-F3 given the following
two conditions:
(C1) In poorer countries sectoral productivities are ranked as Ai < Ac < 1.
(C2) Elasticities of substitution are ranked as σi < σc < 1.
Note that both sets of conditions are required. If the two elasticities are equal, the model
explains F1 and F3, but not F2. In that case, sectoral labor shares are equal. On the
other hand, if sectoral productivities are equal (Ac = Ai), the model can explain F1 and
F2, but not F3.
6.4 Simulation
We illustrate these findings with a simulation where we set parameters to reasonable values.
In particular, let α = 0.35, σc = 0.75, σi = 0.5, β = 0.95 and δ = 0.06. While this is
not an actual calibration, the values are chosen such that (i) they respect requirements
C1-C2, and are reasonably close to typical calibrations. Since our goal is to illustrate the
analytical findings, we do not need to fit particular countries exactly.
The exercise is to derive cross-sectional implications from the model when relative
development is driven by the productivity parameters Ac and Ai. We do this by solving
the model by a sequence of (Ac, Ai) pairs. In particular, we choose grids of 100 equally
spaced values for Ac between [0.75, 1], and for Ai between [0.5, 1]. Examples of productivity
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pairs are thus (0.5, 0.75), (0.75, 0.875), (1, 1). This is equivalent to assuming that the half-
life of eliminating the productivity gap is the same in the two sectors. Since the initial
gap is bigger in investment, productivity “growth” is faster there.
Figure 19: Simulation results
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Figure 19 presents the results. The top left panel shows the assumed productivities
across“countries”(grid points). The bottom left panel plots the cross-sectional relationship
between the labor share and relative development, where GDP is calculated as GDP =
yc + pyi and its value is relative to the maximum possible (when Ac = Ai = 1). The
upward sloping line is consistent with F1.
The top right panel plots the sectoral labor shares against the grid. Stylized fact F2
implies that the consumption sector labor share should be below the investment sector
labor share, which is reproduced by the model. Finally, the bottom right panel depicts
the correlation between the relative price of investment and the aggregate labor share. As
discussed above, there are two opposing effects: one is the direct impact of asymmetric
technology, and the other is the indirect impact through the capital-labor ratio. The first
effect dominates, therefore the simulation also reproduces stylized fact F3.
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7 Foreign direct investment
While our model can generate the empirical correlations seen in the data, an alternative
mechanism is worth discussing. There is some evidence in the literature that exposure to
FDI might also explain the lower labor shares of CEEU countries (IMF, 2007; Decreuse
and Maarek, 2015a). The mechanism described in Decreuse and Maarek (2015b) is the
following.
FDI investors arrive with a technology advantage and attract workers from local firms
offering higher wages.14If foreign investors are more productive, and the gains from higher
productivity are shared between capital and labor, sectors with a higher foreign penetration
will be both more productive and offer a higher wage, but they will have a lower labor
share nevertheless. An important implication is that in this mechanism, FDI does not
hurt labor in an absolute sense, only relative to the productivity improvement.
As the country convergences and the productivity advantage of foreign firms decreases,
wages are expected to converge and after the initial decline, the labor share will increase.
Thus, the labor share is expected to follow a U-shape pattern in time. However, if the
local economy does not catch up, and the productivity differential between foreign and
domestic owned firms is persistent, wage convergence will stop.
A related mechanism is described in the off-shoring model of IMF (2007). In this
model, offshoring and foreign direct investment lead to a decline in labor shares in both
the originating and the host country. Offshoring from advanced to emerging economies is
mainly motivated by the lower wage level of the host countries. When for example the
relative cost of capital falls – which can be observed in the last decades - firms in advanced
economies offshore mainly tasks with a low elasticity of substitution, and high elasticity
of substitution tasks will more likely be substituted with capital. As the relative cost of
capital is usually higher in emerging market economies due to capital scarcity, tasks with
low substitutability between factors will have a higher capital share than the average task,
lowering the aggregate labor shares in the emerging economies. In this model, production
remaining in advanced countries will be more capital intensive, lowering the labor share
14There is a large literature on wages and working conditions in multinational corporations, which
typically find that these companies pay higher wages and offer better conditions (Brown et al., 2009; Budd
et al., 2005; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2013; Hijzen et al., 2013)
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in the advance countries as well.
To test these hypotheses, one would need sectoral data. Unfortunately, reliable data
on the sectoral FDI are not available. Therefore, we run a country level panel regression
to see if there is a relationship between FDI stocks and the labor share at least at the
country level.
Table 3: Labor share and stock of net FDI liabilities, total economy and nonagricultural
labor share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
labor share labor share
including agriculture excluding agriculture
VARIABLES EU CEEU EU CEEU
net fdi stock to gdp -0.0525** -0.116*** -0.0950*** -0.0749**
(0.0216) (0.0309) (0.0269) (0.0301)
relative price of AIC 0.591** 1.198*** 0.484* 0.678***
(0.269) (0.178) (0.238) (0.164)
Constant 0.0296 -0.547*** 0.107 -0.106
(0.266) (0.171) (0.234) (0.157)
Observations 503 230 503 230
R-squared 0.246 0.357 0.321 0.159
Year FE YES YES YES YES
country FE NO NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
relative price of AIC is expressed relative to EU15
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results show that the higher is the stock of net FDI liabilities, the lower is the labor
share for both the total and the non-agricultural labor share. This relationship holds even
among the CEEU countries (see Table 3 ). As before, identification comes mostly from
the cross-section: once we add country fixed effects, the coefficient becomes insignificant.
Overall, while only suggestive, the evidence indicates that foreign investment may be an
important mechanism to understand short-run changes in the labor share.
8 Conclusion
This paper documented labor share developments in Central- and Eastern European EU
member states (CEEU). We discussed methodological issues, compared changes to other
EU countries (EU13), and presented facts both at the aggregate and sectoral level. We have
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shown that sectoral reallocation played a minor role in the dynamics of the labor share,
with the partial - but important - exception of agriculture. Overall, we find no evidence
to a systematic fall in the labor share in our sample period, especially once we focus on
non-agricultural sectors. There is significant heterogeneity across sectors, however: in line
with the literature, we also find a sustained fall in the manufacturing labor share.
When comparing the labor share between CEEU and EU13 countries, we show it
is generally lower in the former group. Once we control for differences in the relative
price of consumption, however, the difference essentially disappears. Intuitively, when
relative prices differ, the labor share based on GDP may be misleading as guide to welfare
statements based on the labor share. Using a simple two-sector model, we argue more
formally that relative prices are important for cross-country comparisons between countries
at different levels of development.
The model is also consistent with other stylized facts, such as the relationship between
sectoral productivity and labor shares. Other explanations emphasize the role of foreign
direct investment (FDI) - we find preliminary evidence that FDI may indeed have played
a role in generating differences at the country level. We plan further investigations in this
direction, using sectoral and firm level data.
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Figure 20: Agriculture labor share calculated with value added at factor cost (including
subsidies) and basic prices (excluding subsidies) in CEEU and EU13 countries
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Figure 21: Aggregate labor share based on value added at factor cost and at basic prices,
CEEU and EU13 countries
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Figure 22: Share of self-employed in total employment in agriculture and the total economy
excluding agriculture in EU13 and CEEU countries
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Figure 23: Agriculture and non-agricultural total labor share in EU13 countries
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Figure 24: Aggregate labor shares for EU13 countries
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Figure 25: Aggregate labor share with or without agriculture, CEEU countries
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Figure 26: Decomposition of contribution of change in sectoral composition and sectoral
labor shares to change is non-agricultural labor share,1995-2016
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